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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO LISTEN
Peter J. Ferrara* and Carlos S. Ramirez**
I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom of speech guaranteed in the First Amendment1 includes not
only the freedom to speak, but also—as a necessary corollary—a
constitutionally protected Freedom to Listen. In other words, where a
freedom to speak is guaranteed, a freedom to choose what speech to receive
is also secured. As one court has put it, “Effective speech has two
components: a speaker and an audience. A restriction on either of these
components is a restriction on speech.”2
A considerable body of legal precedent has recognized such a “Freedom
to Listen” doctrine, though not explicitly in such terms. Moreover, such a
doctrine has been studied only scarcely and is mentioned rarely in literature
or legal scholarship. We fill that void below through an examination of the
relevant precedent and through an examination of the cases that have
developed the Freedom to Listen doctrine. In so doing, we discuss the
fundamentals of speech—namely, the necessary existence of a speaker, an
audience, and content. We then examine the legal status of the marketplace
of ideas, and the role that listening—or choosing not to listen—plays in
public debate, political speech, and the public’s receipt of information.

* Peter Ferrara is the General Counsel for the American Civil Rights Union (ACRU).
He graduated from Harvard College, magna cum laude, in 1976 and Harvard Law School,
cum laude, in 1979. He is a member of the District of Columbia and U.S. Supreme Court
Bars. He served as a Senior Staff Member in the White House Office of Policy Development
from 1981-1983 and as Associate Deputy Attorney General of the U.S. from 1991-1993. He
has authored several books and publications dealing with economics and the law.
** Carlos Ramirez graduated from American University in 2006 with a B.A. and from
Drexel University in 2009 with a J.D. He is a former intern and legal researcher with the
American Civil Rights Union. He is currently on Active Duty with the U.S. Army JAG
Corps. Prior to his time with the ACRU and the U.S. Army, he served as a summer clerk to
Judge Richard B. Klein of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and as a student intern with
the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. He is admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances.”).
2. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Finally, we examine the role that the Freedom to Listen plays in
government action in a variety of regulatory scenarios, including radio and
television broadcasting, the Internet, and the political speech of private
groups. Through this examination, we have concluded—as we hope our
readers will—that the Freedom to Listen is a necessary and binding part of
First Amendment jurisprudence because it serves to prevent government
interference with public debate and protects the public from any form of
censorship.
II. LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE FREEDOM TO LISTEN
The term “Freedom to Listen” is the name we give to the protections
provided by the First Amendment—the right of a person to receive speech.3
The following section details where the legal foundations of the Freedom to
Listen lie, and how this doctrine has evolved over the years into its current
state.

3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Com’n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (stating that the constitutional guarantee of free speech serves significant
societal interests that are wholly apart from a speaker’s interest in self-expression, and that it
protects the public’s interest in receiving information); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (holding that the freedom of expression includes the right to receive as well as the
right to communicate ideas); Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 259-60 (4th Cir.
2005) (stating that the First Amendment protects the right to receive the speech of others);
De la O v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 417 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that the right to
receive information is as equally protected under the First Amendment as the right to convey
it); Clement v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the First
Amendment embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to
receive it and that the right to receive publications is a fundamental right); Rossignol v.
Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the First Amendment protects both
a speaker’s right to communicate information and ideas to a broad audience and the
intended recipient’s right to receive the information and ideas); Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ. 330 F.3d 888, 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he First Amendment is concerned not only with
a speaker’s interest in speaking, but also with the public’s interest in receiving information.”)
(citation omitted); Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbus Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 585, 591 (6th
Cir. 2003) (stating that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information);
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1251 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that the speech
component of the First Amendment includes freedom to receive speech); Johnson v. Cnty. of
L.A. Fire Dep’t, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that the freedom of
expression includes the right to receive as well as the right to communicate ideas).
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A. Parties Relevant to the Freedom of Speech
As obvious as it sounds, few analysts consider that for speech to occur,
several elements must be present: a speaker, a listener, and content.
Without these elements, speech cannot be effective.4 That is, a person with
something to say, but no one to hear it, cannot be a speaker—just as a
person without something to hear cannot be a listener. With these elements
in mind, courts recognize that the citizen is entitled to seek out a message
that appeals to him or her without government restriction.5 This protection
from government interference or control is centered on the proposition that
speech is the vehicle through which citizens express their beliefs, the
mechanism through which citizens learn new information to influence and
test those beliefs, and the sole manner to bring those beliefs to bear on
government; therefore, the citizen must be free to choose what speech to
accept, adhere to, reject, ignore, or respond to, without fearing the specter
of censorship.6
Awareness that speech involves a party to listen to and receive that
speech, as well as the party speaking, led to recognition of the Freedom to
Listen in the late 1960s in Stanley v. Georgia.7 In Stanley, the police searched
the Georgia home of Robert Eli Stanley, a suspected and previously
convicted bookmaker, based on a federal warrant to seize betting
paraphernalia.8 They found none, but instead seized three reels of
pornographic material from a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom, and
later charged Mr. Stanley with the possession of obscene materials, a crime
under Georgia law.9 The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the conviction.10

4. See U.S. West., 182 F.3d at 1232; Banks, 330 F.3d at 896.
5. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000). The Court
said that
[i]t is through speech that our convictions and beliefs are influenced, expressed,
and tested. It is through speech that we bring those beliefs to bear on
Government and on society. It is through speech that our personalities are
formed and expressed. The citizen is entitled to seek out or reject certain ideas
or influences without Government interference or control.
Id.
6. Id.
7. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
8. Id. at 558.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 559.
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The United States Supreme Court unanimously overturned that decision
and invalidated all state laws forbidding the private possession of obscene
materials.11 In holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not
permit a state to prohibit the mere possession of obscene material, the
Court stated that the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and press
protect the right to receive information and ideas regardless of their social
worth.12 Going further, Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court,
stated that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch.”13 With those powerful words, Justice
Marshall set the stage for the further understanding of what the First
Amendment protects.
B. The Marketplace of Ideas
The concept of the “marketplace of ideas” is often attributed to Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States.14 The concept provides a rationale for freedom of expression based
on an analogy to economic competition in a free market, where all products
are free to compete, and the consumers choose which products will prevail.
In the free expression of a “marketplace of ideas,” the truth or the best
policy arises out of the competition of alternative ideas in free public debate,
11. Id.
12. Id. at 564 (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas,” and the “right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth . . . is fundamental to our free society.”).
13. Id. at 565. In the same paragraph, Justice Marshall further notes that “[o]ur whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men’s minds.” Id.
14. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). While Justice Holmes did not
use the term “marketplace of ideas,” he implied the idea in his dissenting opinion:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition. . . . But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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with the listening public free to determine the truth out of that clash of
ideas. The “marketplace of ideas” is now recognized as an important
component of democracy. The Freedom to Listen is inherent in this concept
of the marketplace of ideas, as is the freedom of speech. Just as a
commercial marketplace includes both sellers and buyers, the marketplace
of ideas includes both speakers and listeners. The First Amendment’s
protection of public debate provides an environment for both speakers and
listeners to engage in this free and transparent public discourse.15 Society’s
interests in enjoying a transparent debate and in receiving information
without government interference are paramount and are protected in
conjunction with the speaker’s interest in self-expression.16 Thus, the
Constitution goes further than merely protecting speech from government
inhibition and works to secure a citizen’s right to unfettered access to the
speech of others.17
The First Amendment, therefore, necessarily protects the listener’s right
to receive information without fear of government intrusion or
censorship.18 As stated before, without a listener, there can be no speech;
thus, the First Amendment’s protection afforded to the recipient of
information is as paramount to its functionality as the protection afforded
the speaker.19

15. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (“[T]he First Amendment reflects a
‘profound national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .’”) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
16. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). The
Court said,
The constitutional guarantee of free speech ‘serves significant societal
interests’ wholly apart from the speaker’s interest in self-expression. . . . By
protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas from government
attack, the First Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving
information.
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See Clement v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The First
Amendment ‘embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to
receive it.’”) (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)); see also Stanley,
394 U.S. at 564 (1969) (stating that the First Amendment protects the right to receive
literature).
18. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65; see also Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbus Metro.
Library, 346 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that The First Amendment protects the
right to receive information) (citation omitted).
19. See U.S. West., Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
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Consequently, the First Amendment concerns not only the freedom of
the speaker to speak, but also the freedom of the audience to hear or see the
expression.20 As Justice Marshall so poignantly pointed out in Stanley v.
Georgia, our constitutional system stands firmly against the thought of
giving the government any control over the thoughts of men’s minds;
therefore, the state has no business telling a man what books to read and
what information to receive.21 With that unanimous statement of
unmistakable clarity from the Supreme Court, it can only be concluded that
the First Amendment offers unfettered protection to the citizen’s right to
receive information.22
C. Political Speech
The field of political speech provides the most crucial area of the law for
the First Amendment’s firm protections of both speakers and listeners.23
The most significant case exploring the nature of the Freedom to Listen in
the context of political speech is Buckley v. Valeo,24 where the Court
explored the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971.25 In a per curiam opinion, the Court upheld federal limits on
campaign contributions by individuals,26 but expanded the nature of First
Amendment protections for the recipients of speech.27
The Buckley Court found that regulation of federal campaign
expenditures involves the most fundamental First Amendment protection.28
In discussing this proposition, the Court stated that the ability to discuss
political issues and the qualifications of candidates is paramount, and that

20. See Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).
21. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
22. See De la O v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 417 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he right
to receive information is as equally protected as is the right to convey it.”) (citation omitted).
23. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
24. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25. Id. at 6.
26. While we refrain from adding any more drops to the vast sea of opinion and analysis
regarding Buckley, we note that we do not endorse the holding of the case. However, since
the Buckley decision is seminal in the development of the Freedom to Listen, as evidenced by
the decisions cited in note 31 infra, we discuss it here.
27. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30-32.
28. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).

2011]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO LISTEN

7

the ability to engage in free and unfettered debate is important in the
political process.29 The Court said,
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political
expression in order ‘to assure (the) unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.’ Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957). . . . In a republic where the people are sovereign, the
ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who
are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation. As the Court observed in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971), ‘it can hardly be doubted that the
constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office.’30
Some or all of this statement—underscoring the importance of such
debate—has been cited since in many First Amendment cases.31
29. Id. at 14. The Court also said,
Although First Amendment protections are not confined to “the exposition of
ideas,” Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), “there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs . . . of course includ(ing) discussions
of candidates. . . .” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). This no more
than reflects our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
Id.
30. Id. at 14-15.
31. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781 (2002) (“‘[D]ebate
on the qualifications of candidates’ is ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms,’ not at the edges.”); Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 521-22 (4th
Cir. 2003) (“‘Discussion of public issues’ and ‘debate on the qualifications of candidates’ for
public office have always been ‘integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution’ . . . [a]nd ‘it is by no means easy to see what statements
about a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks.’
The First Amendment therefore ‘affords the broadest protection to such political expression
in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas,’ since ‘in a republic where the
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates
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A discussion cannot exist without more than one speaker, more than one
listener, and the ability for the development of debate through the logical
progression of an argument. In the “debate over the qualifications of
candidates,” challenges to the candidates’ records must be brought to the
public’s attention so that the public has the ability to question, and the
candidates have the opportunity to respond. It is here that the Freedom to
Listen protects the public from censorship.
Where a speaker wishes to address the qualifications of a candidate for
office but is muted by government power, the greater offense to the First
Amendment lies not in the speaker’s silence, but in the fact that the public is
being denied the opportunity to assess the validity of the speaker’s message
and to debate the merits of the candidate in light of the information the
speaker wishes to convey. As the Court said in Buckley, “In a republic where
the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those
who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation.”32

for office is essential. It is for that reason that the First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.’ In suppressing
criticism of their official conduct and fitness for office on the very day that voters were
heading to the polls, defendants did more than compromise some attenuated or penumbral
First Amendment right; they struck at its heart.”); Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm.
v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The First Amendment reflects a ‘profound
national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.’”); Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Discussion of
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of
the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure (the) unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.’”); Phelan v. Laramie Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Bd. of Trs., 235 F.3d 1243, 1247 n.2 (11th Cir.
2000) (“[P]olitical speech is entitled to the ‘broadest protection.’”); Iowa Right to Life
Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to . . . our Constitution.”); Day v.
Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression . . . .”). Internal citations have been omitted in all of these quotes.
32. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.

2011]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO LISTEN

9

D. Other Precedents
Another important case in the development of the Freedom to Listen
doctrine is United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.33 That case
involved a federal statute concerning cable TV operators who provided
channels primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming.34 The
statute required operators either to fully scramble or otherwise fully block
those channels to non-subscribers, or to limit the transmission of those
channels to hours when children are unlikely to be viewing—set by
regulation as between 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM.35
But the scrambling technology at the time was subject to “signal bleed,”
which unreliably allowed video or audio portions of the programming to be
heard to varying degrees at different times.36 To avoid fines under the law,
most cable operators chose the time channeling option, whereby
transmission of sexually-oriented channels was limited to between 10:00 PM
and 6:00 AM, thus precluding transmission of such channels for two-thirds
of the day.37 The evidence showed that thirty percent to fifty percent of
sexually-oriented adult programming was viewed by households before
10:00 PM.38
In Playboy, the producers of the Playboy Channel claimed the regulation
violated their First Amendment rights.39 The Court agreed on the grounds
that the state interest in protecting minors from such programming could
be achieved by the less-restrictive alternative of providing households with
complete channel-blocking devices free of charge, with adequate notice of
that option.40 The Court required this less-restrictive alternative because
“adults have a constitutional right to view” the Playboy Channel and other
non-obscene, sexually-oriented adult programming.41 Justice Kennedy
elaborated on this right for the majority, saying that
[i]t is through speech that our convictions and beliefs are
influenced, expressed, and tested. It is through speech that we
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
Id. at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 806-07.
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 718 (D. Del. 1998).
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 807.
Id. at 816, 824-26.
Id. at 811.
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bring those beliefs to bear on government and society. It is
through speech that our personalities are formed and expressed.
The citizen is entitled to seek out or reject certain ideas and
influences without Government interference or control.42
He further added that
[t]he Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and
judgments, including esthetic and moral judgments about art
and literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the
Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to
make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate
or approval of a majority. Technology expands the capacity to
choose; and it denies the potential of this revolution if we assume
the Government is best positioned to make these choices for us.43
What Kennedy espoused is the Freedom to Listen doctrine.
Similarly, Board of Education v. Pico44 involved the removal of books
from high school and junior high school libraries that were deemed “antiAmerican, anti-Christian, and anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy[.]”45 A
plurality upheld a trial court’s ruling, saying that the right to receive
information
is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press that
are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, in two senses. First,
the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s
First Amendment right to send them. . . . More importantly, the
right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s
meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and
political freedom.”46
The doctrine was also applied in Clement v. California Department of
Corrections.47 In Clement, a California prison inmate challenged a prison
rule prohibiting inmates from receiving mail containing material
downloaded from the Internet.48 The court noted that “[p]risoners are not
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 817 (emphasis added).
Id. at 818.
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
Id. at 857.
Id. at 867 (emphasis added).
Clement v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1150.
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allowed to access the internet directly, so Clement asserts that the policies
effectively prevent inmates from accessing information that is available only
on the [I]nternet,” and that “many legal materials are readily accessible only
on the [I]nternet.”49 The Court struck down the restriction, saying, “[T]he
right to receive publications is . . . a fundamental right. The dissemination
of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free
to receive and consider them.”50 The court also said, “The First Amendment
‘embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right
to receive it.’”51
In another precedent case, the Los Angeles County Fire Department, as
part of its sexual harassment policy, prohibited county firemen from
possession of sexually-oriented magazines—such as Playboy—in county
firehouses.52 A fire captain sued, claiming the restriction violated his First
Amendment rights.53 The court agreed and struck down the restriction,
recognizing the Freedom to Listen doctrine by saying,
Defendants argue that, because plaintiff is seeking to merely read
rather than communicate ideas, his First Amendment rights are
entitled to a lesser degree of weight. The Court must reject this
argument as contrary to the fundamental principle of First
Amendment law that freedom of expression includes the right to
receive as well as the right to communicate ideas.54
The court added,
It is a fundamental principle of First Amendment law that the
government cannot regulate material in order to prevent the
readers from developing certain ideas. Such regulations are
attempts at altering the reader’s viewpoint, and as such are the
most disfavored of all regulations touching upon the First
Amendment. . . .
Defendants are, of course, free to proscribe offensive
behavior or language which may result from the “sex-role
stereotyping.” But, defendants may not proscribe the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1151 (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)).
Id. (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
Johnson v. Cnty. of L.A. Fire Dep’t, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 1438 (citation omitted).
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communication of “sex-role stereotyping” simply because
defendants disagree with the message.55
The Fourth Circuit provided an instructive precedent in Rossignol v.
Voorhar.56 Plaintiff Kenneth Rossignol owned a local newspaper that was
highly critical of the County Sheriff and his operation of the local police
department.57 In the early pre-dawn hours of Election Day, sheriff’s
deputies rode throughout the county to purchase all the copies of
Rossignol’s paper to prevent Election Day readers from seeing what he had
to say about the candidates, including the County Sheriff and his political
allies.58
The court held that the defendants’ conspiracy constituted an
unconstitutional prior restraint on the plaintiff’s freedom of speech, and
also recognized a Freedom to Listen when it said,
The First Amendment is about more than a publisher’s right to
cover his costs. Indeed, it protects both a speaker’s right to
communicate information and ideas to a broad audience and the
intended recipients’ right to receive that information and those
ideas. Liberty of circulation is as important to freedom of the
press “as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation,
the publication would be of little value.”59
In Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, a homeless man was excluded from a
public library on the grounds he was misbehaving in violation of library
regulations.60 While the court upheld the regulations as protecting the
library use of others, it recognized the Freedom to Listen doctrine in saying
that the Freedom of Speech “embraces the right to distribute literature . . .
and necessarily protects the right to receive it,” and “a right to receive
information founded under the First Amendment is implicated in this
case.”61 The court added,
Justice Brennan’s oft-quoted remark in Lamont now constitutes
the hallmark of the right to receive information: “[t]he
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1441 (citations omitted).
Ressignol v. Voohar, 316 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 519-20.
Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1247 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1251, 1260.
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dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise
willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them . . .
[for][i]t would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers.”62
The court concluded,
Our review of the Supreme Court’s decisions confirms that the
First Amendment does not merely prohibit the government from
enacting laws that censor information, but additionally
encompasses the positive right of public access to information
and ideas.63

62. Id. at 1252.
63. Id. at 1255; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(“The constitutional guarantee of free speech ‘serves significant societal interests’ wholly
apart from the speaker’s interest in self-expression. By protecting those who wish to enter the
marketplace of ideas from government attack, the First Amendment protects the public’s
interest in receiving information. . . . In [previous] cases, the critical considerations were that
the State sought to abridge speech that the First Amendment is designed to protect, and that
such prohibitions limited the range of information and ideas to which the public is
exposed.”) (citations omitted); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767, 783
(1978) (concerning a case where the Court invalidated a state prohibition on speech by
corporations aimed at influencing the outcome of a state referendum because it limited the
access of the public to information and ideas, saying, “[T]he First Amendment . . . afford[s]
the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (“[T]he state may not, consistently
with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The
right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of
thought, and freedom to teach . . . . Without these peripheral rights the specific rights would
be less secure.”) (citation omitted); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
(stating that the First Amendment “embraces the right to distribute literature and necessarily
protects the right to receive it”) (citation omitted); Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251,
260 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Because the musical performances at the [Town community center]
involved protected expression, it follows that [Plaintiff] Willis herself had a First
Amendment right to listen to them. . . . [W]here there is a protected right of speech, there is
likewise a protected right to receive the speech.”) (citation omitted); De La O v. Hous. Auth.
of El Paso, 417 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he right to receive information is as equally
protected as is the right to convey it.”) (citation omitted); Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbus
Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The First Amendment protects the right to
receive information.”) (citation omitted); Banks v. Wolf Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888,
896 (6th Cir. 2003) (“‘The First Amendment is concerned not only with a speaker’s interest
in speaking, but also with the public’s interest in receiving information.’” (quoting Chappel
v. Montgomery Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 1997))); Conant v.
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III. APPLICATIONS
Now that we have examined the legal foundations for the Freedom to
Listen, we next discuss how it should be applied to current First
Amendment issues.
A. Regulation of Broadcast Content
The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) old, so-called
“Fairness Doctrine” required radio and TV stations to provide free
broadcast time for opposing views on major, controversial issues contrary
to views a station had previously chosen to broadcast or allow the target of a
station’s criticism to reply. While the Supreme Court upheld the Fairness
Doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,64 the FCC repealed the policy
in the 1980s.65 Recently, however, members of Congress and selfproclaimed “media watchdogs” have begun advocating reinstatement of the
Fairness Doctrine via legislation, regulation, or by implementation of
“localism” initiatives.66
In Red Lion, talk show host Billy James Hargis criticized the book,
Goldwater: Extremist of the Right, by Fred J. Cook, on his daily Christian
Crusade radio broadcast on WGCB in Red Lion, Pennsylvania.67 Mr. Cook
sued arguing that the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine entitled him to free air time
to respond to Hargis’s show.68 The radio station argued that the Fairness
Doctrine regulations were an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of
speech.69
The Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine 8-0, citing a Senate report that
concluded that such regulation was justified due to the limited spectrum of
the public airwaves.70 Writing for the Court, Justice Byron White stated:

Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The right to hear and the right to speak are flip
sides of the same coin.”); U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“Effective speech has two components: a speaker and an audience. A restriction on either of
these components is a restriction on speech.”) (citation omitted).
64. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
65. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5057-58 (1987).
66. See Broad. Localism, 23 FCC Rcd. 1324, 1397 (2008) (issuing the statement of
Chairman Martin).
67. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-90 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 371-73.
69. Id. at 392-93.
70. S. REP. NO. 86-562, at 7 (1959).
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A license permits broadcasting, but the lisensee [sic] has no
constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to
monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow
citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which
prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his
frequency with others . . . .
. . . It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount.71
The Court warned that if the doctrine ever restrained speech, then its
constitutionality should be reconsidered.72
The Court, however, has found similar laws unconstitutional when
applied to newspapers, where there is no technical limit on the number of
possible newspapers. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, Chief
Justice Warren Burger, writing for a unanimous court, said that
“[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably ‘dampens the vigor and
limits the variety of public debate.’”73
Later cases weakened the constitutional foundations for the Fairness
Doctrine. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress could not forbid editorials by non-profit stations
that received grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.74 The
Court’s 5-4 majority opinion, authored by Justice William J. Brennan Jr.,
stated that while many now considered that expanding sources of
communication had made the Fairness Doctrine’s limits unnecessary, “We
are not prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding approach
without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological
developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of
broadcast regulation may be required.”75 After noting that the FCC—out of
fear that its rules might be “chilling speech”—was considering repealing the
Fairness Doctrine’s rules on editorials and personal attacks, the Court
added,
Of course, the Commission may, in the exercise of its discretion,
decide to modify or abandon these rules, and we express no view
on the legality of either course. As we recognized in Red Lion,
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
See id. at 390.
See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984).
Id. at 376 n.11.
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however, were it to be shown by the Commission that the
fairness doctrine “[has] the net effect of reducing rather than
enhancing” speech, we would then be forced to reconsider the
constitutional basis of our decision in that case.76
In the FCC ruling that led to Telecommunications Research and Action
Center v. FCC, the FCC held that teletext was a new technology that created
a high demand for a limited resource, and thus should not be subjected to
the Fairness Doctrine.77 The Telecommunications Research and Action
Center (TRAC) and the Media Access Project (MAP) argued that teletext
transmissions should be regulated like any other over-air communications
technology and should be subject to the Fairness Doctrine.78 In 1986, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
concluded that the Fairness Doctrine was applicable to teletext, but that the
FCC was not required to apply it.79 In a 1987 case, Meredith Corp. v. FCC,
two other judges on the same court concluded that Congress did not
mandate the Fairness Doctrine and that the FCC did not have to continue
to enforce it.80
In August 1987, the FCC abolished the Fairness Doctrine by a 4-0 vote in
the Syracuse Peace Council decision.81 The FCC stated that the
government’s intrusion into the content of programming occasioned by the
enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine restricted the journalistic freedom of
broadcasters and actually “inhibit[ed] the presentation of controversial
issues of public importance to the detriment of the public and in
degradation of the editorial prerogatives of broadcast journalists.”82 The
FCC suggested further that, due to the many media voices in the
marketplace, the Fairness Doctrine should be deemed unconstitutional.83
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld this landmark ruling in February 1989.84 Two years previously, in

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 380 n.12 (citation omitted).
Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 517-18.
See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 873 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5043 (1987).
Id. at 5050-51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 5051-52.
See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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June 1987, Congress attempted to mandate the Fairness Doctrine by statute,
but President Ronald Reagan vetoed the legislation.85
If the Fairness Doctrine ever comes before the Court again, then it
should be found unconstitutional. First, both experience and analysis show
that the regulation does restrain or reduce speech. Political talk-radio
programming flourished after repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, including
national programs with tens of millions of daily listeners. Indeed, such
political talk radio likely saved AM radio stations from economic
extinction, as music formats migrated to the FM stations better suited to
such broadcasts.
Radio stations operate in a market where programming decisions are
based on maximizing advertising revenue and the projected number of
listeners. Regulation requiring airtime for alternative and opposing views
would remove the focus on such maximization. Consequently, stations
would lose control over their own programming and suffer loss of revenues.
This would lead them to avoid talk-radio formats and may drive many
stations out of business altogether. Either result effectively restrains or chills
speech and should be considered unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
recognized precisely this effect in the case of newspapers in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.86 Additionally, the FCC recognized this same
effect on radio stations as part of its reasoning for repealing the Fairness
Doctrine.87 In Red Lion, the Court itself recognized that if the Fairness
Doctrine could later be shown to restrain speech, it would be
unconstitutional.88
Second, Red Lion is now outdated because of the sweeping,
revolutionary, technological advances since that Court’s analysis based on
the technology of the 1960s. We now have satellite radio unlimited by radio
spectrum constraints. Radio broadcasts are also now available over the
Internet. Hundreds of government-financed National Public Radio stations
now provide an alternative of views on the Left as compared to the views on
the Right that have been most successful in commercial broadcast markets.
The Fairness Doctrine also covered television, though it was rarely applied
in that context. Today, cable and satellite television provide hundreds of TV
stations to almost all American homes.
85.
(1987).
86.
87.
88.

See The Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, S. 742 & H.R. 1934, 100th Cong.
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5052 (1987).
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
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The limitations of the radio and TV broadcast spectrum were the whole
basis of the Red Lion decision upholding the Fairness Doctrine. Where
those limitations do not apply, as in newspaper publishing, the Court has
found the Fairness Doctrine’s limitations to be unconstitutional invasions
of freedom of speech for the reasons previously discussed.89 Given modern
radio and TV broadcast technology, that same analysis of the Fairness
Doctrine should now apply to radio and television broadcasts as well.
Third, the listeners and viewers of radio and TV broadcasts have
Freedom to Listen constitutional rights that are relevant here as well. The
competitive marketplace broadcasts the programming that listeners and
viewers want because of the fundamental incentives driving stations to
maximize ratings and advertising revenues. Fairness Doctrine regulation
forces stations to depart from the programming viewers and listeners favor,
which violates the First Amendment’s Freedom to Listen. If favored
programs or stations are driven off of the air, then that is an obvious
unconstitutional violation of the Freedom to Listen. It is the public who will
suffer the detriment of being unable to receive the information its preferred
radio content provides, therefore, it is the public that will be unable to
participate in the marketplace of ideas. Consequently, the First
Amendment’s protection of the Freedom to Listen is implicated, and the
Fairness Doctrine would necessarily create an unjustifiable restriction.
Moreover, political talk radio involves core political speech, which
should receive the maximum protection of the First Amendment. If the
Court can protect the freedom of an individual to possess obscenity and
pornography in such cases as Stanley v. Georgia90 and U.S. v. Playboy,91 then
it should be even more willing to protect the Freedom to Listen to the
political talk radio consumers may choose. To the extent that the Fairness
Doctrine might apply to religious broadcasts, the Freedom to Listen
constitutionally protects the freedom of listeners to enjoy their favored
religious broadcasts without being burdened with opposing religious
viewpoints that they do not want to hear or to suffer the loss of such
programming altogether because of the burdens of Fairness Doctrine
regulation.
The Freedom to Listen also protects audiences from the perverse results
of localism regulations that may effectively reestablish the Fairness Doctrine
by another name. The FCC has long required broadcast licensees to serve
89. See, e.g., Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258.
90. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
91. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 826-27 (2000).
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the needs and interests of their local communities, based on the statutory
language of the original 1934 Communications Act itself. Such localism
regulation could be used to condemn nationally-syndicated, political talk
radio shows in favor of locally-produced shows with hometown talk show
hosts. Or, it could be used to challenge a station’s programming on the basis
of the preferences of a localism committee of local, political activists.
Radio and TV stations, however, are in the business of serving the needs
and interests of their local communities. Such service is exactly what they
do in their attempts to maximize ratings and, hence, advertising revenue. In
other words, the competitive marketplace inherently drives stations to serve
the needs and interests of their local communities. If FCC regulations drive
high-rating, nationally-syndicated programming off of the air in favor of
local shows, then the regulation would violate the audience’s
constitutionally-protected Freedom to Listen. Similarly, displacing the
programming that the broad audience in the local community prefers in
favor of the preferences of a select committee of local activists would also
unconstitutionally violate the audience’s Freedom to Listen.
B. The Internet
The Internet currently enjoys unfettered freedom of expression. It is
consequently the perfect marketplace of ideas, with literally millions of
websites competing to communicate. The idea that the government can
improve this by regulation, such as requiring websites to include contrary
views or links to websites providing opposing viewpoints, is hopelessly
elitist. How can the government possibly know what to include among
supposed opposing viewpoints or even keep track of all the websites
expressing such views? Would Christian websites be required to include
links to Muslim sites and Muslim sites to include links to Jewish sites, and
would all of these be required to include links to pornographic sites and vice
versa?
All such regulation would violate the constitutionally-protected freedom
of speech of the website sponsors to communicate what they want and only
what they want. It would also violate what we have called the Freedom to
Listen, which in this context would be the freedom of Internet users to
choose the content they want to view. Such regulation could cause website
providers to close their websites to resist the government’s dictation of what
they can communicate, resulting in a loss to Internet users as well as the
website providers. Alternatively, it may just interfere with what the users
want to see and learn, exposing them to sites and views they may want to
avoid.
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On the Internet today, users are perfectly free to choose what to research
and view. Government regulation cannot add to this freedom. It can only
impose restrictions on that freedom, which would serve as precedents for
still harsher restrictions.
C. Campaign Finance
The recent Supreme Court case of Citizens United v. FEC provides an
important current example of how the Freedom to Listen doctrine can be
applied in the area of campaign finance.92 Citizens United was a non-profit,
501(c)(4) corporation founded in 1988 by individuals who wanted to
communicate and advance their particular ideological viewpoint to the
general public.93 Funding for the corporation was raised predominantly
from individuals across the country that shared and wanted to advance the
organization’s ideological message.94 A small portion of its funding came
from for-profit corporations.95
Citizens United produced movies advancing its ideological message on
the War on Terror, illegal immigration, the United Nations, and religion in
public life.96 Movie theaters across the country showcased these movies, and
national retail chains sold the DVD versions.97 One of these movies,
Rediscovering God in America, ranked as the top-selling, historical
documentary on Amazon.com for a short period.98
In 2008, Citizens United produced Hillary: The Movie (“Movie”), a
feature-length (ninety minutes) documentary.99 Financing for the
production and advertising budgets came from the corporation’s general
treasury.100 Individuals and other non-corporate donors contributed over $1
million specifically for the Movie.101 Two contributions, however, totaling
$2,000, came from for-profit corporations.102

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Joint App. at 11a, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
Id.
Joint App., supra note 93, at 11a-12a.
Id. at 13a.
Id. at 12a.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
Joint App., supra note 93, at 17a.
Id.
Id.
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The Movie focused primarily on presenting the facts regarding five
prominent episodes in Senator Clinton’s life:
--Her role in the firing of the staff of the White House Travel Office,
apparently to provide contract opportunities to associates. The Clinton
Justice Department criminally prosecuted the fired office director who had
thirty years of service, but the director was acquitted in full;
--Her role in official retaliation against a woman who accused President
Clinton of sexual harassment;
--Her role in violations of federal campaign finance laws during her
Senate campaign and her husband’s presidential campaigns;
--Her sometimes inconsistent record and views on the issues of health
care, job creation, and national security. With regard to the latter, the film
focused on her shift from authorizing the Iraq War to opposing it once the
Democratic presidential primaries began;
--President Clinton’s pardon of a Puerto Rican independence activist
who murdered four people and wounded fifty others in a 1975 terrorist
bombing in New York City, while she was at the same time seeking
endorsement from Puerto Rican community activists for her 2000 Senate
campaign.
Communication of the above facts concerning the five controversies
would have been an important contribution to the public debate in the 2008
election year. After all, the Movie communicated the intended ideological
message to viewers that Hillary Clinton was not fit for the office of
President.
Citizens United did not have any connection with any candidate,
campaign, campaign committee, political committee, or political party.103
Additionally, no aspect of the production or promotion of the Movie was
coordinated with any such political entity.104 Moreover, the Movie did not
expressly advocate for the election or defeat of Hillary Clinton for any office
or for the election or defeat of any other candidate.105 It did not contain an
appeal to vote for or against Hillary Clinton.106
The Movie was planned for release in January 2008, with complete
promotional efforts: a website, broadcast advertising, a compendium book
detailing the Movie, theaters booked for screenings, and DVDs for sale by

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 14a.
Id.
Id. at 13a.
Id.
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prominent retailers.107 Citizens United also received an offer to make the
Movie available to households subscribing to digital cable television
through a service called Video on Demand.108 The Movie would have been
listed as one of many movie options on the service, under a heading
covering political movies called Elections ‘08.109 To view the Movie, the cable
subscriber would have to specifically order it, and a compressed data
electronic signal including the Movie would be sent to the subscriber’s TV
for viewing.110
But under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), the
Movie was considered an “electioneering communication” because it
mentioned a federal presidential candidate, and it would be broadcast
during the 30-day period before the primaries, caucuses, and conventions
occurring throughout 2008 and during the 60 days before the 2008 general
election.111 The broadcast ads for the Movie would also be electioneering
communications for these same reasons.112
Consequently, the FEC took the position that broadcast of the Movie was
prohibited under the BCRA until the conclusion of the 2008 election.113
Moreover, even ads promoting the Movie would be subject to regulation
requiring Citizens United to publicly disclose its donors, which would likely
reduce the number of donors and the amounts donated.114 Additionally,
Citizens United would have been required to report the ads in FEC filings as
campaign speech, even though they would not have been connected to any
campaign. Lastly, Citizens United would have been required to include
mandatory FEC disclaimers in the ads. 115
The Movie could be seen only by viewers who sought it out, wanted to
see it, and were willing to pay to do so, unlike a campaign ad broadcast on
general TV networks.116 To see the Movie in theaters, individual viewers
would have to research where and when it was being shown, go to the
theater, pay for it, and devote ninety minutes of time to watch it. If they
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 888-89.
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 888.
Id. at 887.
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were going to watch it on DVD, they would have to research where they
could buy it, go there, whether online or in a store, pay for it, and again
choose to sit through it for ninety minutes. If they were going to watch it
through Video on Demand, they would have to search through the Video
on Demand list of available movies, select the Movie, pay an additional fee
for it, and again choose to sit through it for ninety minutes to receive its
message. The Movie would be broadcast only to an individual viewer’s TV
when the viewer specifically requested the signal bearing the Movie.
These were the only means for a viewer to watch the Movie, because it
was to be distributed only through these three alternatives: theater
screenings, DVD, and Video on Demand cable broadcasts. This was in stark
contrast with the viewers of thirty and sixty second political ads on free
broadcast TV or standard cable TV. Viewers of such ads do not choose to
view them. Rather, the ads interrupt other broadcasts that the viewers have
chosen to watch, and the viewers generally sit through the ads because they
are short interruptions of the chosen broadcasts. The viewers also devote no
significant time commitment to watch these short political ads. Broadcast of
the Movie through the three means—theater screenings, DVD, and Video
on Demand—is functionally indistinguishable from downloading video
content from the Internet, which the District Court in McConnell v. FEC
found to be a form of media completely different from television and radio
advertising.117
Viewers of the Movie through these means hold their own
constitutionally protected freedom of speech rights to watch and listen to
the Movie under the Freedom to Listen doctrine. The words of Justice
Marshall in Stanley v. Georgia would seem directly applicable to this
situation: “If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch.”118 No more or less is involved when
a viewer chooses to watch the Movie at home on DVD, through Video on
Demand cable broadcasts, or in a movie theater.
There is no compelling state interest in restricting the freedom of speech
rights of these viewers to watch and listen to the Movie and its speech.
Courts have justified restrictions on campaign financing and speech on the
basis of a compelling state interest in preventing corruption or the

117. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176, 571 (D.D.C. 2003).
118. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). Justice Marshall further notes in the
same paragraph: “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men’s minds.” Id.
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appearance of corruption.119 There is no potential for such corruption,
however, when individuals seek out, select, pay for, and commit themselves
to watch the Movie, thereby receiving the information and facts conveyed
in the Movie. By taking these steps, viewers are not buying influence with
the Democratic presidential primary rivals of Hillary Clinton or with
anyone else, but are merely seeking out and obtaining information they
think is relevant to the political process, which is constitutionally protected
conduct. When the broadcast or distribution of the Movie is limited to
these viewers, prohibiting such broadcast or distribution would violate the
free speech and Freedom to Listen rights of these viewers without
justification.
Moreover, when the Movie broadcast is limited to those who are seeking
out the message and information presented in the Movie, the potential for
corruption is constrained sharply. The Movie’s producer is communicating
only to those who are already seeking out the message and information,
rather than the general public, which is not nearly as likely to win influence
or political favors in return. When the free speech rights of the viewers are
weighed with the free speech rights of the producers in this situation, along
with the more limited opportunity for corruption, the balance
overwhelmingly favors freedom of speech, rather than a speculative interest
in preventing corruption. The FEC would thus not have the constitutional
authority to prohibit broadcast of the Movie through Video on Demand,
theater screenings, or DVDs.
This conclusion is all the more certain because the Movie involves core
political speech, which is the real focus of the First Amendment.120 If the
constitutionally protected Freedom to Listen was found paramount with
regard to the admittedly obscene material in Stanley v. Georgia,121 or to
broadcasts of the Playboy Channel in United States v. Playboy,122 then how
much more obvious is its application to the Movie in Citizens United? This

119. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652
(2007); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
120. E.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (“MCFL”); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480 (1985) (“NCPAC”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
121. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
122. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 826-27 (2000).
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is the meaning of Buckley and its progeny.123 We should not allow our First
Amendment jurisprudence to collapse into the frivolous perversity of
providing more constitutional protection to pornography than to core
political speech.
The decision in Citizens United, however, was not based on these
grounds.124 The Court issued a broader, more sweeping statement on the
meaning of free speech under the First Amendment, concluding it was all
about freedom, with no role for the government’s attempts to equalize
speech.125
The Court did indicate support for what we have called the Freedom to
Listen, saying, “The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened selfgovernment and a necessary means to protect it.”126
The Court added further that “[t]he Government may not by these
means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.”127 Additionally, the
Court said that, “it is inherent in the nature of the political process that
voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in order to
determine how to cast their votes.”128
IV. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment protects more than the speaker’s right to speak. It
also protects the Freedom to Listen—that is, the right of an audience to
choose what to listen to or watch. Government interference to prevent an
audience’s freedom of choice violates the Constitution, absent a compelling
state interest. Recognizing this Freedom to Listen provides complete
protection to freedom of expression.
Furthermore, it has important applications to campaign finance,
broadcast regulation such as the Fairness Doctrine, Internet freedom, and
other issues. The Freedom to Listen Doctrine protects the right of talk123. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the
ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for
the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation.”).
124. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
125. Id. at 899.
126. Id. at 898 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 899.
128. Id.
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radio audiences to listen to the shows they want to hear and is a further
reason that the Fairness Doctrine would be unconstitutional today. Ratings
earned in the competitive marketplace would be relevant evidence
supporting a Freedom to Listen argument, providing additional
constitutional protection against “localism” regulations giving effective veto
power to local political activist to overrule the listening preferences of silent
majority audiences.
The Freedom to Listen doctrine would also protect Internet users and
their freedom to choose the website content they want to view. That would
further protect websites from regulation imposing content on them they did
not want to include, such as links to opposing views, which would
negatively impact website viewers. The doctrine would also further protect
political and campaign speech in contexts of audience choice where no
corruption interest could possibly apply to justify restrictions on such
speech or its funding.

